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Abstract 
As a part of multinational corporations (MNCs), subsidiaries operate in distinct host countries 
and have to deal with their external context. Host country political embeddedness, in particu-
lar, helps subsidiaries to obtain knowledge and understanding of the regulatory and political 
context, and to get access to local networks. Moreover, they get some guidance and support 
from their headquarters. Distance between MNC home and host countries, however, alienates 
subsidiaries from the MNC and influences the extent of subsidiary host country political em-
beddedness. We suggest that the host country political and regulatory context moderates the 
effect of distance on subsidiary host country political embeddedness by reducing the need 
and/or value of headquarters support. Using a sample of 124 European manufacturing subsid-
iaries, we find that distance (space) and context (place) matter jointly: the impact of distance 
is stronger for subsidiaries that operate in host countries with low governance quality and low 
political stability in place. 
Keywords: Political embeddedness, MNC subsidiaries, headquarters-subsidiary relationships, 
institutional theory, distance, institutions  
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1. Introduction 
A multinational corporation’s (MNC) operations are internationally dispersed across different 
political, social, and regulatory contexts, where it faces a broad set of stakeholders. Political 
actors are an important part of this stakeholder network. They shape public policy and control 
resources, and can thus create or constrain opportunities for MNCs (Baron, 1995; Getz, 1997; 
Wan and Hillman, 2006). Therefore, MNCs have an incentive to interact with and influence 
policy makers in both developing and developed countries (Brewer, 1992; Choi, Jia, and Lu, 
2014; Luo, 2001; Murtha and Lenway, 1994; Rajwani and Liedong, 2015). 
One important way in which MNCs can interact with and influence policy makers is 
by letting their subsidiaries become embedded in their local host country’s political networks. 
Subsidiary political embeddedness can be defined as the extent to which the subsidiary main-
tains linkages to local political actors such as governments, industry associations, and unions. 
From an institutional perspective, such linkages enable subsidiaries to acquire host country-
specific and actor-specific knowledge, which they can in turn use to negotiate and actively 
influence their legitimacy (Doh, Lawton, and Rajwani, 2012; Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975; 
Henisz and Zelner, 2003; Hillman and Wan, 2005; Peng and Luo, 2000). 
Scholars have made very valuable contributions to our understanding of why subsidi-
aries invest more or less into linkages with political actors. The antecedents of subsidiary po-
litical embeddedness have received considerable scholarly attention. For example, it has been 
shown that subsidiaries adapt their political embeddedness to the institutional context in the 
host country (Bonardi, Holburn, and Van den Bergh, 2006; De Figueiredo, 2009). Further-
more, subsidiaries adapt their political embeddedness to the MNC-internal context (Hillman 
and Wan, 2005; Kostova, Roth, and Dacin, 2008; Luo, 2003). 
Nevertheless, we suggest that we need to revisit this issue for the following reasons. 
First, while studies have investigated an extensive range of country-level factors and their 
impact on political embeddedness, there are few studies that examine more fine-grained di-
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mensions (Berry, Guillén, and Zhou, 2010; Jackson and Deeg, 2008). In particular, there is a 
need for integration of both the multifaceted nature of institutions and the role of distance as 
country-level factor in our studies of international business (Henisz and Swaminathan, 2008). 
Second, while a number of studies have claimed to examine the multifaceted impact of coun-
try-level factors on MNC subsidiaries, some of them have recently been criticized for mixing 
up effects (van Hoorn and Maseland, 2016). More specifically, studies in international busi-
ness have often failed to distinguish between the effects of institutional distance and context. 
To shed light on these issues, we build on institutional theory (e.g. Berry et al., 2010; 
Kostova et al., 2008), as well as recent international business and economic geography litera-
ture (e.g. Beugelsdijk, McCann, and Mudambi, 2010). We investigate the independent and 
joint effects of country-level factors, namely the geographic and contextual distance between 
a subsidiary host and its headquarters’ home country, and the host country context in terms of 
governance quality and political stability, on political embeddedness. In line with economic 
geography literature, we will refer to these two factors as space (distance) and place (context) 
effects (Beugelsdijk et al., 2010; McCann, 2011). We develop several hypotheses and test 
them using data on 124 European manufacturing subsidiaries from a wide range of home 
countries. 
Our results provide support for part of our hypotheses and reveal that space and place 
have independent as well as joint effects on subsidiary host country political embeddedness. 
With these results, we aim to contribute to research in a number of ways. First, we contribute 
to the literature on subsidiary political behavior (e.g. Blumentritt and Nigh, 2002; Hillman 
and Wan, 2005; Luo, 2001). We show how space and place matter for subsidiary political 
embeddedness and provide support for the idea that political embeddedness carries both po-
tential benefits and costs that need to be weighed up carefully by MNCs (Bucheli and Kim, 
2012; Darendeli and Hill, 2016; Hadani and Schuler, 2013; Hillman, Zardkoohi, and Bierman, 
1999). 
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Second, we advance literature by arguing that space and place are not only independ-
ent, but also interactive, i.e. both distance and host country context matter jointly (Mondejar 
and Zhao, 2013; Peng and Zhou, 2005). Third, we contribute to the institutional perspective in 
strategic management research. Our unique dataset allows us to differentiate between effects 
of distance and context on political embeddedness (van Hoorn and Maseland, 2016). 
 
2. Conceptual background and hypotheses 
2.1. Host country political embeddedness 
Due to its foreignness, a firm can face hazards when it conducts business abroad (Eden and 
Miller, 2001; Hymer, 1976; Johanson and Vahlne, 2009; Kindleberger, 1969). More specifi-
cally, an MNC, as a “stranger in a strange land” (Eden and Miller, 2001: 4), bears a twofold 
burden: First, it may be treated less favorably than its host country local counterparts because 
of its foreignness. Second, it is likely to lack understanding of local institutions and customs, 
which can result in unfamiliarity hazards (Eden and Miller, 2001; Zaheer and Mosakowski, 
1997). 
Previous studies have identified strategies to mitigate foreignness hazards and estab-
lish legitimacy (e.g. Elango, 2009 for the United States; Luo, Shenkar, and Nyaw, 2002 for 
China). One such strategy is external embeddedness in the MNC host country political con-
text (Halinen and Törnroos, 1998, Luo, 2001). It can help the MNC to obtain knowledge and 
understanding of the regulatory and political context, and to get access to networks. Moreo-
ver, it signals commitment, and can thus help the MNC to negotiate and construct legitimacy 
in a host country context (Kostova et al., 2008; Pache and Santos, 2013). 
Notwithstanding the benefits of host country political embeddedness, it can also be a 
double-edged sword (e.g. Bucheli and Kim, 2012; Darendeli and Hill, 2016). The double-
edged nature of political embeddedness underlines its strategic relevance for MNC manage-
ment, and helps to explain why MNC research has witnessed an increasing interest in the an-
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tecedents and types of political embeddedness (for reviews see e.g. Hillman, Keim, and 
Schuler, 2004; Lawton, McGuire, and Rajwani, 2013; Lux, Crook, and Woehr, 2011). 
Researchers have also paid attention to host country embeddedness of different MNC 
units (Andersson, Forsgren, and Holm, 2002; Forsgren, Holm, and Johanson, 2005; Yamin 
and Forsgren, 2006). Subsidiaries and headquarters can both be embedded in a host country, 
and thereby help to mitigate the hazards of foreignness and contribute to MNC success in the 
host country. Headquarters, however, are often embedded less strongly in host countries 
(Hoenen, Nell, and Ambos, 2014; Nell, Ambos, Schlegelmilch, 2011; Yamin and Forsgren, 
2006). This can partly be explained by MNCs’ complex structures, i.e. the dispersion of oper-
ations across distance and in different country contexts (Kostova and Zaheer, 1999; Roth and 
Kostova, 2003). 
In the contemporary view, MNC headquarters are seen as “network orchestrators” 
(Foss and Pedersen, 2002; Ghoshal, Moran, Almeida-Costa, 1995). They are supposed to en-
sure coherence within the MNC, and coordinate and support their subsidiaries (Goold and 
Campbell, 2002; Nell and Ambos, 2013). Despite the geography of MNCs making it impossi-
ble for headquarters to strongly embed themselves in each host country, they can rely on the 
embeddedness, representation and local expertise of their subsidiaries (Birkinshaw, Hood, and 
Jonsson, 1998; Rugman and Verbeke, 2001). 
 
2.2. MNC country-level influences and geography 
It is widely acknowledged that country-level, i.e. geographic, factors imply differences in 
subsidiary behavior, and thus also in the degree of subsidiary host country political embed-
dedness within the MNC (Blumentritt and Nigh, 2002; Hillman and Keim, 1995; Lenway and 
Murtha, 1994; Rodriguez et al., 2006). Yet studies often neglect the multidimensionality of 
geography, as claimed by scholars in economic geography and more recently also in interna-
tional business (Beugelsdijk et al., 2010; McCann, 2011). Henisz and Swaminathan (2008) 
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and Berry et al. (2010), for instance, highlight the need for the integration of both the multi-
faceted nature of distance and of country institutions as country-level factors in international 
business studies. McCann (2011), in particular, referred to these two distinct notions of geog-
raphy as space (i.e. distance) and place (i.e. context). 
The management of distance in the MNC is a difficult undertaking (Ambos and Am-
bos, 2009; Ghemawat, 2001, 2011; Kostova and Zaheer, 1999). To understand why this is the 
case, there have been calls for a more fine-grained study of distance, theorizing about under-
lying mechanisms and actual effects (Berry et al., 2010; Salomon and Wu, 2012). More spe-
cifically, scholars highlight the need to differentiate between difficulties in the management of 
MNCs caused by physical versus context-related dimensions of distance (Doz, Santos, and 
Williamson, 2001). The CAGE framework, in particular, covers both the physical dimension 
of geographic distance, as well as cultural, administrative, and economic distances, which 
describe contextual differences between different national contexts (Ghemawat, 2001, 2011). 
Also, concerning the second dimension of geography, i.e. place, there is agreement 
among scholars that the country setting, comprising e.g. institutions or culture, has a critical 
impact on MNC management and international business in general (e.g. Morgan and Kristen-
sen, 2006; North, 1990). Scholars advocate for an in-depth study of specific country-level 
factors to gain a deeper understanding of their effects on firm strategies (Jackson and Deeg, 
2008). Instead of theorizing about the effect of highly aggregated and broad country-level 
constructs, they suggest using fine-grained constructs, which are more directly linked to the 
phenomenon being investigated. In the case of political embeddedness, for instance, the regu-
latory and political country context arguably has a more immediate impact than more general 
measures of institutional quality or culture. 
MNC subsidiaries are located in unique contexts and at varying distances from the 
MNC home country (Kostova et al., 2008; Kostova and Zaheer, 1999; Roth and Kostova, 
2003; Zaheer, Schomaker, and Nachum, 2012). Apparently, both notions of geography are 
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relevant for MNC subsidiaries’ behavior. Yet the question is how space and place influence 
subsidiary host country political embeddedness. Indeed, previous research suggests that MNC 
headquarters can support subsidiaries, provide “a sense of direction, certainty, and legitima-
cy” (Kostova et al., 2008: 998) and thereby help them tackle issues of foreignness. What is 
more, MNC research proposes that some subsidiaries will be more able to adopt efficient and 
effective practices from the MNC than others (Kostova, 1999; Kostova and Roth, 2002). 
In this paper, we build on insights from the abovementioned pieces of literature to in-
vestigate country-level antecedents of subsidiary host country political embeddedness. We 
expect subsidiary host country political embeddedness to vary with the distance from MNC 
headquarters (i.e. space). Moreover, the need to become embedded will differ between subsid-
iaries, depending on the host country context (i.e. place). Fig. 1 illustrates our conceptual 
framework. 
----- Insert Fig. 1 here ----- 
 
2.3. Space and subsidiary host country political embeddedness: The role of distance 
The distance between the MNC’s home and its subsidiaries’ host countries is a distinguishing 
feature of the MNC (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977; Zaheer, 1995). Prior research has under-
scored that its geographic dispersion allows the MNC to tap into diverse markets, acquire 
knowledge and seize opportunities (Kogut, 1983; Rosenkopf and Almeida, 2003; Rugman, 
Verbeke, and Nguyen, 2011). Yet it also creates difficulties with regards to communication 
with subsidiaries, understanding of their host country context (ul Haq, Drogendijk, and Holm, 
2017), parenting quality (Goold and Campbell, 2002; Nell and Ambos, 2013), and mainte-
nance of legitimacy (Kostova and Roth, 2002). In this paper, we seek to uncover how distance 
leads to more subsidiary host country political embeddedness. 
Distance has been argued to become increasingly obsolete in modern international 
business (Beugelsdijk et al., 2010; Friedman, 2005; Håkanson and Dow, 2012; Kostova and 
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Zaheer, 1999). However, it actually continues to be relevant and receives attention of MNC 
researchers (e.g. Eden and Miller, 2004; Rugman et al., 2011; Zaheer et al., 2012). What is 
more, as international business scholars have started to understand distance as a multidimen-
sional construct, they have recognized the need to pay attention to and disentangle the poten-
tially distinct mechanisms of geographic and contextual distance (Beugelsdijk and Mudambi, 
2013; Beugelsdijk, Nell, and Ambos, 2017; Doz et al., 2001; Ghemawat, 2001, 2011). We 
suggest that both geographic and contextual distance have an effect on subsidiary host country 
political embeddedness. While we believe that the direction of the effect is similar for geo-
graphic and contextual distance, we spell out their mechanisms separately in the following. 
Geographic distance implies difficulties in MNC management. We argue that it limits 
the MNC headquarters’ involvement in a host country context, as well as their influence and 
guidance to subsidiaries (e.g. Kostova and Zaheer, 1999; Kostova et al., 2008). 
First, geographic distance was found to be associated with higher travel costs, which 
make face-to-face interaction between headquarters and host country political actors more 
expensive (Ambos and Ambos, 2009; Ghemawat, 2001, 2011; Goodall and Roberts, 2003; 
McCann, 2011). This, in turn, may lead to limited headquarters host country embeddedness, 
i.e. headquarters’ relationships with local businesses, as well as political actors (Forsgren et 
al., 2005; Hoenen, Nell, Ambos, 2014; Nell et al., 2011; Yamin and Forsgren, 2006). Not-
withstanding direct travel costs to one particular host country, headquarters need to maintain 
relationships in all host country contexts. This makes headquarters host country embed-
dedness even more expensive. If geographic distance between home and host countries is 
high, it is thus very likely that subsidiaries are the only link to host country actors. As a result, 
we expect a geographically distant subsidiary to have more contact with host country political 
actors. 
Second, coordination and communication are more difficult across geographic dis-
tance (Ambos and Ambos, 2009; Ghemawat, 2001, 2011; Goodall and Roberts, 2003; 
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McCann, 2011). Geographic distance has been said to shift headquarters’ attention away from 
subsidiaries in general (Bouquet and Birkinshaw, 2008; Monteiro, Arvidsson, and Birkin-
shaw, 2008). Moreover, when subsidiaries and headquarters are located in different time 
zones, a lack of overlap in office hours can impede the interaction between headquarters and 
subsidiaries. Consequently, more distant subsidiaries may also receive less support from 
headquarters, and benefit less from their headquarters’ resources and experience (Giroud, 
2013; Monteiro et al., 2008). Thus, we expect a geographically more distant subsidiary to rely 
more on its own local initiatives and resources (Baaij and Slangen, 2013; Drogendijk and An-
dersson, 2013; Harzing and Noorderhaven, 2006; Kostova et al., 2008). 
Contextual distance refers to the fact that MNCs need to deal with different host coun-
tries (Ambos and Ambos, 2009; Brannen, 2004; Ghemawat, 2001, 2011; Griffith and Harvey, 
2001; McCann, 2011). These can differ from the MNC home country in their cultural, admin-
istrative and economic contexts. We argue that such differences can imply that subsidiaries 
view particular organizational practices as less appropriate and/or efficient for their host coun-
try (Kostova and Roth, 2002). 
Similar to geographic distance, contextual distance can imply coordination and com-
munication problems. In the case of contextual distance, however, these problems are not due 
to a lack of interaction between the headquarters and subsidiaries. Rather, headquarters sup-
port is less valuable for subsidiaries operating in contextually distant host countries. Head-
quarters, for instance, are more likely to misinterpret and misunderstand regulations, customs 
and values in contextually more distant host countries, which can result in misplaced support 
(Bhagat et al., 2002; Kostova, Nell, and Hoenen, 2016; Kostova et al., 2008; Slangen, 2011). 
Hence, we expect contextually distant subsidiaries to rely less on headquarters support and to 
enforce contacts with host country political actors. 
Moreover, contextual distance between home and host countries may aggravate the li-
ability of foreignness, the “social costs of access and acceptance” (Zaheer, 2002: 352). Such 
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costs arise from a lack of local networks and unfamiliarity with a host country context (Za-
heer, 1995; Zaheer and Mosakowski, 1997). The options to limit such costs and reduce the 
liability of foreignness include, for example, choosing an entry mode with a local partner or 
contractual protection (Eden and Miller, 2001; Elango, 2009; Luo et al., 2002). Similarly, we 
expect subsidiaries to invest into host country political embeddedness to balance the liability 
of foreignness. 
Overall, we believe that headquarters’ support to and interaction with more distant 
subsidiaries is lower. Regardless of whether it is geographic or contextual distance, we thus 
hypothesize that distance calls for more subsidiary host country political embeddedness: 
H1a: Greater geographic distance between the MNC home and a subsidiary country is asso-
ciated with stronger subsidiary host country political embeddedness. 
H1b: Greater contextual distance between the MNC home and a subsidiary country is associ-
ated with stronger subsidiary host country political embeddedness. 
So far, we have argued that distance alienates subsidiaries from the MNC. Therefore, 
subsidiaries will increasingly turn to the host country context to overcome issues of foreign-
ness and negotiate their legitimacy, for instance through host country political embeddedness 
(Kostova et al., 2008). Yet embeddedness is an investment (Hadani and Schuler, 2013; Hill-
man et al., 1999) and the extent of subsidiary host country political embeddedness is likely to 
depend on both the distance from the headquarters as well as the host country context. We 
argue that distance and context jointly determine the necessity and/or value of local headquar-
ters’ support. 
 
2.4. Place and subsidiary host country political embeddedness: The moderating role of the 
host country context 
The results of numerous studies indicate that firms are constrained by the institutional context 
of a country, which influences their behavior and strategies (Jackson and Deeg, 2008; Oliver, 
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1997). White et al. (2014: 306) even refer to country institutions as “’gatekeepers’ through 
which [subsidiaries] must obtain access to conduct business”. Moreover, firms’ unfamiliarity 
with institutions may imply competitive disadvantages, raise costs, create ambiguity and risk 
(Grosse and Trevino, 2005; Lawton et al., 2013; Wan and Hillman, 2006). This underlines 
how important and challenging it is for firms to understand the host country institutional con-
text properly and to gain legitimacy. This is particularly true for the MNC: although every 
firm needs to cope with home country institutions, MNCs also face a range of diverse host 
country contexts (Benito and Gripsrud, 1992; Gaur and Lu, 2007; Kostova and Zaheer, 1999). 
We contend that subsidiary political embeddedness is not equally important through-
out different institutional contexts: for subsidiaries in some host countries, political linkages 
and headquarters support are more important than for their counterparts in other countries. 
While studies have looked into host country institutions and their direct impact on firm strate-
gy (e.g. Delios and Beamish, 2001; Henisz, 2000a; Kostova et al., 2008), we argue that host 
country institutions weaken the relationship between distance and subsidiary host country 
political embeddedness. 
According to institutional logics, the regulatory pillar of institutions covers country-
specific legally enforceable rules and political systems, which can incentivize desirable and 
prevent undesirable behavior, and promote specific firm structures (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1991; Kostova and Zaheer, 1999; Scott, 1995). Based on this, we focus on the moderating 
impact of the regulatory pillar of institutions and the political context here. More specifically, 
we follow institutional researchers’ calls for a more fine-grained study of the impact of coun-
try institutions on strategy (e.g. Jackson and Deeg, 2008). Rather than using broad constructs, 
we seek to use constructs that are more directly linked to subsidiary host country political 
embeddedness. Thus, we use governance quality and political stability as important indicators 
(Globerman and Shapiro, 2003; Slangen and Van Tulder, 2009). 
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2.4.1. Governance quality 
Governance quality describes the quality level of the bureaucracy of a country and its inde-
pendence from political pressures, as well as the government’s credibility to commit to poli-
cies. Overall, it summarizes the “’inputs’ required for the government to be able to produce 
and implement good policies and deliver public goods” (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, 
2009: 3), and can thus be seen as an indicator of the quality of a country’s ”governance infra-
structure” (Globerman and Shapiro, 2003). We hypothesize that the level of host country 
governance quality weakens the mechanisms of the relationships between both geographic 
and contextual distance, and the extent of subsidiary host country political embeddedness. 
In Hypothesis 1a, we argued that the positive effect between geographic distance and 
subsidiary host country political embeddedness can be explained by a lack of headquarters 
support and headquarters’ own host country political linkages. Similarly, the positive relation-
ship between contextual distance and subsidiary host country political embeddedness (Hy-
pothesis 1b) was linked to headquarters’ problems with understanding host country contexts 
and providing accurate support, as well as animosity issues. However, in host countries where 
governance quality is high, headquarters support and involvement become less important even 
in geographically and contextually more distance countries. In addition, the animosity issues 
in contextually distant host countries are less pronounced when host country governance qual-
ity is high. This is because it is easier to navigate bureaucracy and access public services in 
well-governed countries. First, the likelihood of discriminatory treatment is reduced when 
host country governance quality is high. Second, more transparency in the governance infra-
structure makes it easier to identify and contact competent authorities in a host country. Third, 
it is easier to cope with bureaucrats and/or political actors when the bureaucracy is somewhat 
free from political pressures and the credibility of a government’s commitment to policies is 
high in a context of high governance quality. 
 13 
Thus, we argue that increased distance (which decreases the quantity and quality of 
headquarters support in dealing with the local political context) leads to more subsidiary host 
country political embeddedness, but that this relationship is weaker in the context of high host 
country governance quality. We hypothesize the following: 
H2a: The positive association between geographic distance and subsidiary host country polit-
ical embeddedness is weakened when host country governance quality is high. 
H2b: The positive association between contextual distance and subsidiary host country politi-
cal embeddedness is weakened when host country governance quality is high. 
 
2.4.2. Political stability 
Country contexts are not entirely stable. Rather, they can change over time, which has impli-
cations for firm strategy (Carney and Gedajlovic, 2002; Dacin, Goodstein, and Scott, 2002; 
Wright et al., 2005). Political stability, in particular, is one such dimension of the country con-
text. It refers to the predictability and likelihood of change in the political regime and policies 
of a country (Henisz, 2000a; Miller, 1992). As with governance quality, we argue that host 
country political stability weakens the positive influence of geographic and contextual dis-
tance on subsidiary host country political embeddedness. 
Again, let us recall that in Hypothesis 1a, increasing geographic distance was linked to 
a lack of headquarters’ support and guidance, which implies more subsidiary host country 
political embeddedness. The positive relationship between contextual distance and subsidiary 
host country political embeddedness (Hypothesis 1b) was explained by a lack of appropriate 
headquarters support and an aggravation of issues related to the liability of foreignness. Yet, 
under the condition of high host country political stability, limited headquarters’ attention and 
involvement in the host country context due to geographic distance from the headquarters 
might become less important. Similarly, issues related to the liability of foreignness and a lack 
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of appropriate support from contextually distant headquarters are less of a problem in a politi-
cally stable host country. This is because a continuity of policies makes it easier to operate in 
politically stable countries. First, subsidiaries’ need for support from headquarters with expe-
rience in handling political instability is reduced when host country political stability is high. 
Second, it is easier to learn about and understand regulations and policies when the likelihood 
of unexpected changes is lower in a context of political stability. Third, efficient policy-
making in politically stable countries reduces subsidiaries’ need for headquarters support in 
advocating for changes in regulations and in terms of resources. 
Our arguments imply that high host country political stability mitigates problems re-
lated to a lack of headquarters’ influence across geographic distance, and to a lack of appro-
priate headquarters support in contextually increasingly distant subsidiaries. Therefore, we 
argue that increased distance leads to more subsidiary host country political embeddedness, 
while the relationship is weaker when host country political stability is high. We hypothesize: 
H3a: The positive association between geographic distance and subsidiary host country polit-
ical embeddedness is weakened when host country political stability is high. 
H3b: The positive association between contextual distance and subsidiary host country politi-
cal embeddedness is weakened when host country political stability is high. 
 
3. Data and methods 
3.1. Sampling and data collection 
We investigated a sample of European manufacturing subsidiaries of MNCs. Subsidiaries 
were defined as legal entities, i.e. firms, with more than 50 employees, whose shares are at 
least 51% owned by affiliated organizational entities from a country other than the subsidi-
ary’s host country. To investigate a more homogenous group and thus allow for higher preci-
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sion in the measurement of constructs, the study focuses on subsidiaries with manufacturing 
responsibilities. 
The data was collected in two stages in 2008 as part of a larger research project. The 
AMADEUS database, containing data on European-based firms, was used to draw a popula-
tion of subsidiaries. A randomly chosen sample of 1,329 manufacturing subsidiaries was then 
first contacted and subsidiary top managers, i.e. heads/CEOs, received questionnaires in paper 
and electronic form. Moreover, in order to enhance response rates, follow-up calls were made 
as part of a second round. In total, 124 questionnaires were used for our analysis (9.3% of the 
target sample). As response rates of (top) managers had generally been identified to be lower 
than those of non-managerial staff, the response rate in our study is satisfactory (Baruch, 
1999). Our rate is also in the range of Harzing et al. (1997; 2012) reporting response rates of 6 
to 16% for mail surveys. In an analysis of non-response bias, t-tests indicated no substantial 
differences between the age and size of the subsidiaries in our sample and the population 
(Armstrong and Overton, 1977). 
The final sample includes manufacturing subsidiaries from more than 20 countries, 
with subsidiaries based in Germany, Poland, France, Spain, and the United Kingdom account-
ing for more than 44%. The home countries of these MNC subsidiaries are mainly European, 
which is representative of our population of European subsidiaries (Chi-test, p = 0.403). Our 
sample shows good variance in terms of both distance between home and host countries, and 
host country contextual factors. At the time of the data collection, the responding subsidiaries 
were approximately 25 years old on average, about 38% of the subsidiaries had been estab-
lished for less than ten years, another 30% had existed for up to 20 years. On average, the 
surveyed subsidiaries employed 720 people, with variance across the sample, i.e. one third of 
subsidiaries with 201 to 500 employees and one quarter between 101 and 200. 
 
3.2. Measures 
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3.2.1. Dependent variable 
To capture subsidiary host country political embeddedness in this study, we build on a survey 
question assessing the strength of relationships with host country actors. Survey respondents 
were asked to rate the perceived strength of ties between their subsidiary and a range of net-
work actors in the host country on a graphical scale (for a similar graphical scale see Ambos 
and Schlegelmilch, 2007). The network actors in the subsidiary’s host country context include 
domestic customers and suppliers, as well as local units of multinational customers and sup-
pliers, host country governments and industry associations. 
Similar to Luo (2001), we asked respondents to assess the strength of subsidiary ties 
with each type of network actor on a six-point Likert-type scale (ranging from “no relation-
ship” to “very strong relationship”). Using a factor analysis, we found three two-item factors, 
namely ties with “customers”, “suppliers” and “political actors”. Focusing on political actors, 
the composite variable subsidiary host country political embeddedness was then produced, 
building on survey items assessing ties with host country governments and industry associa-
tions (Construct Reliability = .80). We used standardized factor scores in our regression mod-
els. 
To check for robustness of our results, we also reran our models with two separate de-
pendent variables, namely subsidiary host country government embeddedness, and subsidiary 
host country industry associations’ embeddedness. 
 
3.2.2. Independent variables 
We conceptualize and operationalize distance between home and host countries as a multidi-
mensional construct. In particular, we build on the CAGE framework, which differentiates 
between cultural, administrative, geographic, and economic distance (Ghemawat, 2001, 
2011). In the measurement of distance, we follow extant international business literature (e.g. 
Bae and Salomon, 2010; Berry et al., 2010). Therein, distance is referred to as the absolute 
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difference between countries (i.e. distance is non-negative). Moreover, it does not attach a 
value to the direction and size of the difference between countries (i.e. distance is non-
directional, symmetric). The home country was clearly defined in our survey instrument as the 
country of the MNC headquarters, to which a subsidiary maintains its main reporting line. 
Thus, we accept that in very large MNCs, the direct supervision and guidance of a subsidiary 
may be taken over by intermediate headquarters, such as divisional or regional MNC head-
quarters units, instead of by the MNC corporate headquarters (Goold and Campbell, 2002). 
Our proxies for the different distance dimensions are frequently used in international business 
and distance literature, and we apply the Mahalanobis technique to control for correlations 
between the CAGE dimensions (Berry et al., 2010; Beugelsdijk, Kostova, and Roth, 2017; 
Mahalanobis, 1936). 
To measure cultural distance, we use Hofstede’s four original dimensions and the ones 
more recently added by Hofstede and Minkov (2010), i.e. long-term orientation/short-term 
normative orientation and indulgence/restraint. The Mahalanobis technique indicated no evi-
dence for correlation between the dimensions (Berry et al., 2010). Administrative distance 
was calculated as the absolute distance of the average of the six dimensions of governance, as 
defined by Kaufmann et al. (2009) in the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project 
(for more details see “3.2.3. Moderating variables”). The high correlation between the six 
WGI dimensions and a factor analysis suggest using one factor (Construct Reliability = .97). 
Geographic distance was assessed on the basis of the CEPII database, which accounts for the 
distance between the most populated cities of a pair of countries (Mayer and Zignago, 2011). 
Finally, economic distance was measured as the absolute difference in GDP per capita as of 
2008 (PPP corrected in 2010 international dollars) with data from the World Development 
Indicators. 
Distance data of these four dimensions was collected for all sets of globally possible 
country pairings (N = 3,721). A factor analysis derived two distinct factors: geographic dis-
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tance was found to stand out, and the other dimensions, i.e. cultural, administrative, and eco-
nomic distance, were loading on one factor (Construct Reliability = .78). This supports the 
view that a distinction between physical distance and distance as an indicator of contextual 
changes across national borders should be made (Beugelsdijk and Mudambi, 2013; Doz and 
Santos, 1997). Thus, we operationalize the CAGE dimensions by differentiating between ge-
ographic distance and a composite measure of contextual distance (cf. Beugelsdijk et al., 
2017; Doz et al., 2001). Contextual distance herein reflects distance in terms of culture, gov-
ernance quality, and economic development. 
 
3.2.3. Moderating variables 
To measure host country governance quality, we adhere to the same source that we used to 
calculate administrative distance (Kaufmann et al., 2009). The WGI data involves perception-
al measures and Kaufmann et al. (2009) define six categories to proxy key dimensions of 
governance quality, namely: control of corruption, government effectiveness, voice and ac-
countability, rule of law, regulatory quality, and political stability. Higher scores indicate 
higher governance quality. In our analysis, we draw on the dimension of government effec-
tiveness to capture the level of host country governance quality. Government effectiveness is 
a combination of responses on “the quality of public service provision, the quality of the bu-
reaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the independence of the civil service from politi-
cal pressures, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to policies” (Kaufmann et 
al., 2009: 6). We also used a composite factor of governance quality to check for robustness, 
as we find support in a factor analysis that the six Kaufmann dimensions form one factor 
(Construct Reliability = .97). 
To capture political stability in the host country, we employ Henisz’s (2000b) index of 
political constraints (Polcon5). This index reflects the extent to which individual actors of 
different branches of government have the power to change policy outcomes arbitrarily. It 
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captures the number of veto powers, and thus political constraints. Low values reflect a con-
centration of policy-making authority and low political stability, whereas high values reflect a 
fractionalization of government, characterizing a more stable political context. We also use 
data from the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) in a robustness test. The EIU political risk 
measure evaluates factors relating to political stability and effectiveness. We reverse the 
measure to reflect political stability, i.e. higher values imply higher stability. 
 
3.2.4. Control variables 
We control for other factors that might have an influence on the extent of subsidiary political 
host country embeddedness. The selection of controls is based on literature on corporate polit-
ical behavior (e.g. Oliver and Holzinger, 2008). 
We use dummies to control for industry effects (following Chen, Chen, and Ku, 2004). 
In particular, we group subsidiaries according to their parent companies’ main industry, dif-
ferentiating between three sectors: high-tech industries, covering electrical and electronics, 
machinery and precision instrument sectors; producer-driven industries, covering chemicals, 
basic metals, metal products, non-metal mineral sectors; and buyer-driven industries, covering 
textiles, food, paper, wood products and leather (for a similar approach see Perri et al., 2013). 
We only use the high-tech parent industry dummy, because using two out of the three dum-
mies in the regression did not increase model fit. In addition, we include a multidomestic 
strategy dummy to control for MNC international strategy. In line with previous studies, we 
use trade flows as key indicators of industry globalization (e.g., Makhija, Kim, and William-
son, 1997; Morrison and Roth, 1992). More specifically, we compiled the LIT index (level of 
international trade) and the IIT index (intra-industry trade) for each subsidiary’s industry for 
each host country to define subsidiary industries (Ghoshal and Nohria, 1993; see Makhija et 
al., 1997 and Kim, Park, and Prescott, 2003 for a similar approach). 
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Furthermore, we control for subsidiary-level characteristics. Based on resource-based 
arguments, a firm’s (political) behavior is influenced by its resource capacity (Hillman, 2003; 
Hillman and Hitt, 1999; Penrose, 1959; Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003). We include subsidiary 
size as an indicator of resource capacity, because larger firms were argued to have more re-
sources to cultivate relationships. Subsidiary size is measured in terms of the total number of 
subsidiary employees. We also control for subsidiary age, as higher firm age is said to come 
with more experience with a local context, and less dependence on external resources and 
actors. We used the logarithm of our measures of size and age. Another subsidiary-level vari-
able is the greenfield dummy, which controls for an influence of the type of subsidiary for-
mation (‘1’ in the case of a greenfield investment). 
Moreover, a number of variables are included to account for headquarters’ efforts re-
garding coordination and control of the overall MNC (see Collis, Young, and Goold, 2007; 
Nohria and Ghoshal, 1997). Socialization captures the headquarters’ investments in the crea-
tion of a common corporate culture, as well as the training of subsidiary managers. Our sur-
vey respondents were asked to indicate their agreement with the four following statements on 
a five-point Likert-type scale: (1) “There is a strong commitment to training and developing 
skilled managers” (2) “Your parent puts a lot of effort into establishing a common corporate 
culture” (3) “Your subsidiary executives participate in extensive international training initiat-
ed by your parent” and (4) “Subsidiary managers share the values of your parent” (Construct 
Reliability = .87). Furthermore, previous studies have found that both subsidiaries and their 
headquarters may be embedded in the host country context to a varying extent (Birkinshaw, 
Toulan, and Arnold, 2001; Forsgren, Holm, and Johanson, 2005; Nell et al., 2011). Hence, we 
included headquarters host country political embeddedness to control for the impact of head-
quarters influence in the local context, e.g. a compensatory effect of headquarters embed-
dedness. We measured this analogously to subsidiary host country political embeddedness 
(Construct Reliability = .87). 
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Matrix organization is a dummy variable that assumes the value ‘1’ whenever a sub-
sidiary responded reporting to more than one (type of) headquarters. A more complex organi-
zational structure was found to make it more difficult for headquarters to interact with and add 
value to subsidiaries (Goold and Campbell, 2002). This might also suggest that headquarters 
tend to be less politically embedded in the host country in the case of a matrix structure, while 
making subsidiary host country political embeddedness relatively more likely. It is also con-
trolled for subsidiary relative competence. Based on two questionnaire items, this variable 
indicates a subsidiary’s know-how with respect to its key manufacturing activity in relation to 
the respective know-how of other subsidiaries of the same MNC (Construct Reliability = .83). 
It ranges from 1 “much below average” to 5 “much above average”. In addition, respondents 
were asked to indicate whether their subsidiary covers all activities of the value-chain, i.e. 
R&D (product development), purchasing, manufacturing, marketing and sales, logistics, HR, 
finance, and stakeholder management (for a similar approach see White and Poynter, 1984). 
Based on those items, the dummy miniature replica is ‘1’ if all functions are covered. 
 
4. Analysis and results 
Table 1 reports the summary statistics and correlations for the variables in our models. All 
hypothesized variables (geographic distance, contextual distance, governance quality, and 
political stability) are standardized. 
----- Insert Table 1 here ----- 
Bivariate correlations and variance inflation factors indicate no severe issues in terms 
of multicollinearity in our data. Nevertheless, there is likely to be a stronger linear depend-
ence among our regressors, and thus higher multicollinearity, when we include interaction 
effects (Aiken and West, 1991; Cohen et al., 2013; Freund, Wilson, and Sa, 2006). To allevi-
ate issues of collinearity, we thus include our interaction terms in a stepwise manner. We find 
no indication of non-normality of the residuals of our variables. Moreover, we consider the 
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problem of common-method bias as very low, because first our independent variables are 
based on objective secondary data, and second, we run models with interaction effects 
(Chang, Van Witteloostuijn, and Eden, 2010; Siemsen, Roth, and Oliviera, 2010). 
We use OLS regression analysis with robust standard errors to assess our hypotheses 
(Table 2). 
----- Insert Table 2 here ----- 
Model 1 includes all controls. In line with previous studies, we find that subsidiary 
size is positively related to subsidiary host country political embeddedness. Moreover, the 
positive effect of the formation dummy indicates that subsidiaries established as greenfield 
investments are more politically embedded. These effects remain stable across all models. 
In Model 2, we include the direct effects of our independent and moderating variables. 
We find that geographic distance is positively related to subsidiary host country political em-
beddedness and that this effect remains stable in Models 3-6, which lends support to H1a. 
However, the direct effect of contextual distance is not significant, which leads us to reject 
H1b. In addition, subsidiary socialization turns out to have a significant effect on subsidiary 
host country political embeddedness. More socialized subsidiaries appear to be on average 
more politically embedded in the host country. This control variable remains significant when 
we include the interaction effects. 
Models 3 and 4 each include an interaction effect between distance and host country 
governance quality. In Model 3, we test the interaction between geographic distance and gov-
ernance quality and find a positive and significant effect of subsidiary relative competence. 
Moreover, the interaction effect is significant at p<0.05 and shows a negative coefficient, 
which is in line with H2a. In Model 4, however, we do not find support for H2b. The interac-
tion effect between contextual distance and governance quality is insignificant. Moreover, the 
fit of Model 4, including the interaction effect, is worse than in the case of Model 2, which 
includes the direct effects of our measures of distance and governance quality only. Our anal-
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ysis lends support to H2a, i.e. an interaction effect between geographic distance and host 
country governance quality, though not for the case of contextual distance, i.e. H2b. 
In Models 5 and 6, we include interaction effects between distance and host country 
political stability. Again, subsidiary relative competence reveals a positive and significant 
influence on subsidiary host country political embeddedness (Model 5). Furthermore, in Mod-
el 5, we find a negative interaction effect between geographic distance and political stability, 
while the interaction between contextual distance and political stability in Model 6 is insignif-
icant. Thus, our findings with regard to the interaction effects between distance and either 
governance quality or political stability are similar. Model 5 lends support to H3a, whereas 
Model 6 indicates that we need to reject H3b (interaction with contextual distance). 
Our results suggest that, on average, space in terms of geographic distance is positive-
ly related to subsidiary host country political embeddedness, i.e. higher physical distance im-
plies more embeddedness. Yet space in terms of contextual distance does not have a direct 
effect. Moreover, when the host country place is well-functioning, i.e. either of high govern-
ance quality or political stability, the direct effect of space on embeddedness becomes weaker. 
However, again, this only holds when we refer to space in terms of geographic distance. The 
interaction effects with regard to contextual distance are not significant. Our findings are also 
confirmed by the interaction plots in Fig. 2 (based on Models 3 and 5). 
----- Insert Fig. 2 here ----- 
The first interaction plot (1) graphically confirms that governance quality weakens the 
positive relationship between geographic distance and subsidiary host country political em-
beddedness. The second plot (2) reveals a similar effect for geographic distance and political 
stability. It illustrates that the impact of geographic distance on subsidiary political embed-
dedness is weaker when political stability is high. In the context of low governance quality / 
political stability, however, geographic distance has a stronger impact on subsidiary host 
country political embeddedness. 
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4.1. Robustness test 
We ran several robustness tests to validate our results. First, we ran censored Tobit regres-
sions with robust standard errors to account for the Likert structure of our dependent variable 
(Wooldridge, 2015). Our results did not change. Second, dropping contextual distance alto-
gether did not change our main results. Again, we found that geographic distance has an ef-
fect, both directly and jointly with governance quality and political stability. 
Third, we evaluated the insignificant direct effect of contextual distance by replacing 
the composite measure of contextual distance with each of the three individual dimensions of 
contextual distance at a time. As in our main models, we found support for the effects of geo-
graphic distance. Moreover, our models with cultural and administrative distance confirmed 
our main results, in which we used the aggregate construct of contextual distance. The direct 
effects of cultural and administrative distance were insignificant. Our model with economic 
distance also yielded some weak evidence for a direct positive effect (p<0.05), i.e. economic 
distance implies more subsidiary host country political embeddedness. Fourth, we ran our 
models including measures of absolute distance between home and host country political sta-
bility as well as governance quality. These distance measures are directly equivalent to our 
host country measures. The models mirror our main analysis, except for the weakly signifi-
cant negative direct effect of political stability distance. 
Fifth, we reran our models with a more limited number of control variables to free up 
degrees of freedom. We explored our models by dropping one insignificant control from our 
main model at a time. Our models yielded robust results. Sixth, we added all distance and host 
country contextual variables jointly. This test mirrored our results of Models 3 to 6 (see Table 
2), though with some variation in the size of the coefficients and significances. This is be-
cause jointly including all country-level measures in one model inflates standard errors, while 
parameter estimates are unbiased (Cohen et al., 2013). Due to inflated standard errors, insig-
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nificances do not necessarily present evidence against our hypothesized negative effects in 
H2a and H3a. 
Seventh, we investigated if alternative operationalizations of our host country institu-
tional variables lead to different results: re-running our models with the Kaufmann Index of 
governance quality and the inverted EIU political risk measure as an indicator of political 
stability reproduced our main models. Finally, we used subsidiary host country government, 
and industry associations’, embeddedness as two separate dependent variables. Our results 
were again robust. More specifically, the models with the industry association-dependent var-
iable yielded even stronger results, whereas the effects for government embeddedness were 
slightly weaker. 
 
5. Discussion 
The main focus of our study is on the multifaceted country-level antecedents of subsidiary 
host country political embeddedness. More specifically, we argue from an institutional per-
spective and empirically differentiate between effects of space and place. We posit that dis-
tance (space) between MNC home and host countries, as well as the specific host country 
context (place), independently and jointly affect the extent of subsidiary host country political 
embeddedness while controlling for a wide range of other factors, for example, on the level of 
the subsidiary. 
Our study demonstrates that geographic distance helps to explain subsidiary host 
country political embeddedness in two different ways. First, subsidiaries that are geograph-
ically distant from their headquarters are more politically embedded than closer ones. This 
supports our reasoning that such distant subsidiaries can rely less on headquarters’ involve-
ment in the local host country political context (e.g. Forsgren et al., 2005) and they lack head-
quarters’ support and guidance (e.g. Monteiro et al., 2008). This leads to a situation in which 
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distant subsidiaries are inclined to invest more into local political relationships despite costs 
of building and maintaining relationships and uncertain outcomes. 
Second, we find evidence for an interaction effect between geographic distance 
(space) and the regulatory and political host country context (place). The positive association 
between geographic distance and subsidiary host country political embeddedness is weaker 
when governance quality is high or when the host country context is politically stable. Appar-
ently, under circumstances of high quality and stability host country contexts, the lack of sup-
port from headquarters seems less relevant. Interestingly, the direct effect of good and stable 
host country contexts on subsidiary political embeddedness is not significantly different from 
zero in our models. 
While the direct effect of geographic distance and its interaction with host country 
context variables find support, we do not find evidence for similar mechanisms when it comes 
to contextual distance. One reason for the insignificant relationship between contextual dis-
tance and political embeddedness might be the lack of ability of subsidiaries to become politi-
cally embedded in contextually distant host countries (e.g. Campbell, Eden, and Miller, 2012). 
Contrary to geographic distance as an indicator for foreignness, contextual distance might 
imply bigger problems with getting access to relevant actors (e.g. Johanson and Vahlne, 2009; 
Zaheer, 1995). Thus, while contextual distance between headquarters and subsidiaries might 
also require subsidiaries to manage their local political context rather on their own, the diffi-
culties for a foreign subsidiary of becoming embedded might mean that, on average, the rela-
tionship between contextual distance and political embeddedness is insignificant. This seems 
to hold also no matter if the local host country context is good and stable or not. 
In a series of robustness tests we further investigated this non-finding. We used indi-
vidual dimensions of contextual distance to check if the non-findings hold despite the fact that 
we believe that contextual distance is best measured as an aggregate construct consisting of 
economic, administrative, and cultural distance (cf. Beugelsdijk et al., 2017). Our main results 
 27 
are to a large extent qualitatively the same, no matter which proxy we use for contextual dis-
tance. There is some weak support for our hypothesized positive effect of contextual distance 
on political embeddedness when we use economic distance as a proxy for contextual distance 
(p<0.05). Yet, this relationship is weak and disappears when interactions are controlled for. 
With our paper, we contribute to the literature in several ways. First, we add to the lit-
erature on subsidiary external embeddedness (e.g. Andersson, Forsgren, and Holm, 2002) and 
political behavior (e.g. Blumentritt and Nigh, 2002). Previous studies tended to understate the 
complexity of antecedents of subsidiary political embeddedness (e.g. Rodriguez et al., 2006). 
Studies on the impact of country-level factors, in particular, have oversimplified relationships 
(e.g. Hillman and Wan, 2005). By arguing for a joint effect of distance and context, we con-
tribute to our understanding of country-level antecedents of political embeddedness. We pre-
sent evidence for the idea that both headquarters’ support and influence across space, as well 
as host country place jointly influence subsidiary behavior. More specifically, geographic 
distance between headquarters and subsidiaries and the political host country context appear 
to jointly influence subsidiary host country political embeddedness. 
Thereby, second, our study also supports the institutional view in international busi-
ness and strategic management research (e.g. Jackson and Deeg, 2008; Kostova et al., 2008; 
Slangen and Van Tulder, 2009). Our theory and results emphasize that different country-level 
dimensions can have different effects on subsidiary strategy. We highlight, in particular, that 
contextual distance and host country governance quality, as well as political stability are re-
lated, but yet different constructs. This supports claims in international business literature that 
“the institutional environment is not a parameter but a rich constellation of interdependent 
structures and systems within a country” (Henisz and Swaminathan, 2008: 539). Empirically, 
the diversity of home and host countries in our dataset allows us to disentangle effects of dis-
tance and context. Previous studies have often claimed to keep these effects separate, while 
suffering from a conflation of distance and context effects, e.g. due to focusing on a single 
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home country (van Hoorn and Maseland, 2016). By using a sample that includes various 
home and host countries, we can actually avoid such conflation. 
Third, the literature on subsidiary external embeddedness and political behavior has 
emphasized the positive aspects in relation to the negative implications of host country politi-
cal linkages. We contend that subsidiaries consciously decide on the extent of host country 
political embeddedness (e.g. Darendeli and Hill, 2016; Mu, Gnyawali, and Hatfield, 2007). 
Our study therefore qualifies previous literature. Our results highlight both the benefits and 
costs of political embeddedness for geographic and contextual distance (e.g. Campbell et al., 
2012). Whereas the positive effect of geographic distance underscores the benefits of subsidi-
ary host country political embeddedness, issues of animosity and ability may be more pro-
nounced in the case of contextual distance and underscore costs of embeddedness in addition 
to its benefits. On average, the effect of contextual distance on subsidiary host country politi-
cal embeddedness seems to be less clear. Benefits and costs of political embeddedness seem 
to differ between geographic and contextual distance. In this respect, we support the notion of 
distance as a multidimensional construct (Bae and Salomon, 2010; Berry et al., 2010) and that 
differentiating between geographic and contextual distance can be fruitful for understanding 
subsidiaries’ decisions to build host country political relationships. 
Of course, our paper also suffers from some limitations: First, we rely on secondary 
data to measure the impact of country-level factors on subsidiary political embeddedness. 
While this eliminates issues of common-method bias, we believe it could be worthwhile to 
assess managers’ perceptions of institutions (e.g. by applying the concept of psychic dis-
tance). Knowing about discrepancies between objective and subjective country-level 
measures could grant further insights into when and how institutions matter for firms’ strate-
gies (Håkanson and Ambos, 2010). Moreover, our theoretical arguments call for the use of 
absolute and non-directional distance measures. As we intend to capture familiarity with the 
host country context, using absolute and non-directional distance ensures that familiarity for 
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domestic firms is zero, and greater than zero for foreign firms (Bae and Salomon, 2010; Berry 
et al., 2010). Nevertheless, the components of contextual distance could also have asymmetric 
effects (Ambos and Håkanson, 2014; Håkanson and Ambos, 2010). This would imply that the 
contextual distance between countries A and B differs from the distance between B and A. 
Future research could investigate the potential impact of directions of distance on subsidiary 
host country political embeddedness. Furthermore, the insignificant finding of contextual dis-
tance indicates that looking into the benefits and costs of political embeddedness could be a 
rewarding endeavor for future research. This may help explain when the benefits or the costs 
of subsidiary political embeddedness prevail in the case of contextual distance. 
Second, we found MNC-internal factors (e.g. subsidiary relative competence) to be re-
lated to subsidiary host country political embeddedness. Although not in the focus of our 
study, future research could theorize about and look into the impact of internal embeddedness 
on subsidiary external embeddedness, or the impact of country-level factors on the relative 
degree of internal versus external embeddedness of subsidiaries. Furthermore, our analysis 
emphasizes that political embeddedness matters for subsidiaries in developed countries. Yet, 
we encourage further research considering subsidiary political embeddedness in developed 
countries with more recent data. Such investigations could help to reveal and understand dif-
ferences in MNC headquarters’ support to distant subsidiaries given current political devel-
opments in developed markets. Finally, we use cross-sectional data and therefore cannot draw 
causal inferences from our regression results. Despite our extensive robustness checks, we 
encourage future research to scrutinize our results using other samples, ideally with longitudi-
nal data. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Our study contributes to our understanding of the multifaceted role of distance and host coun-
try institutions, and their impact on subsidiary host country political embeddedness. Building 
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on the institutional view in international business (e.g. Jackson and Deeg, 2008) and literature 
on political embeddedness (e.g. Blumentritt and Nigh, 2002), we hypothesize and find that 
distance and context matter jointly. Increasing geographic distance, in particular, relates to 
more subsidiary host country political embeddedness, while this effect is weaker when the 
host country context is more politically stable or of higher governance quality. 
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Fig. 1. Conceptual framework. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Marginal effects of home-host country geographic distance on subsidiary host country political 
embeddedness for different levels of host country (1) governance quality, and (2) political stability. 
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Table 1 
Variable means, standard deviations, and correlations (Number of observations = 124). 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 Subsidiary host country political embeddedness 1               
2 Geographic distance 0.14 1              
3 Contextual distance 0.06 0.07 1             
4 Governance quality 0.01 0.04 -0.59* 1            
5 Political stability -0.04 0.14 -0.37* 0.38* 1           
6 High-tech parent industry dummy -0.06 0.21* -0.02 0.00 0.10 1          
7 Multidomestic strategy dummy 0.08 -0.10 0.05 0.03 -0.16 0.11 1         
8 Subsidiary age -0.09 -0.09 -0.22* 0.29* 0.07 -0.09 0.04 1        
9 Subsidiary size 0.18* 0.15 0.18* -0.09 -0.04 0.05 -0.05 -0.03 1       
10 Socialization 0.20* -0.18* 0.11 -0.16 -0.09 0.09 -0.05 -0.07 0.00 1      
11 Subsidiary relative competence 0.14 -0.01 -0.10 0.04 0.08 -0.09 0.00 -0.03 -0.18* 0.05 1     
12 Matrix organization dummy 0.11 0.12 -0.03 0.09 0.11 0.20* -0.09 -0.11 0.08 0.08 -0.06 1    
13 Greenfield dummy 0.22* -0.12 0.17 -0.13 -0.03 -0.10 0.06 0.16 0.05 0.04 -0.04 0.00 1   
14 Miniature replica 0.12 -0.03 0.02 -0.04 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.16 0.04 0.08 -0.11 0.05 -0.11 1  
15 Headquarters host country political embeddedness 0.08 -0.13 -0.03 -0.20* -0.06 0.03 0.01 -0.07 0.02 0.26* 0.13 0.00 0.04 0.11 1 
Mean 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.19 24.94 719.86 3.10 3.66 0.20 0.24 0.72 0.00 
S. D. 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.38 0.40 28.17 1951.57 0.92 0.80 0.40 0.43 0.45 1.00 
* p < 0.05     Descriptive statistics are based on standardized and unlogged observations. 
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Table 2 
OLS regression results: Impact of home-host country distance and host country context on the extent of subsidiary host country political embeddedness 
(Number of observations = 124). 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
High-tech parent industry dummy -0.182 -0.308 -0.359 -0.316 -0.303 -0.352 
 (0.268) (0.273) (0.262) (0.274) (0.258) (0.274) 
Multidomestic strategy dummy 0.195 0.243 0.259 0.254 0.291 0.279 
 (0.228) (0.243) (0.254) (0.242) (0.247) (0.240) 
Subsidiary age (logged) -0.119 -0.150 -0.159 -0.152 -0.166 -0.161 
 (0.092) (0.088) (0.084) (0.088) (0.084) (0.089) 
Subsidiary size (logged) 0.184** 0.180** 0.185** 0.177** 0.200** 0.177** 
 (0.060) (0.061) (0.060) (0.064) (0.059) (0.060) 
Socialization 0.176 0.235* 0.265* 0.237* 0.240* 0.232* 
 (0.109) (0.107) (0.106) (0.107) (0.106) (0.106) 
Subsidiary relative competence 0.193 0.179 0.216* 0.178 0.217* 0.183 
 (0.123) (0.117) (0.105) (0.117) (0.105) (0.116) 
Matrix organization dummy 0.204 0.125 0.129 0.120 0.190 0.153 
 (0.193) (0.196) (0.193) (0.197) (0.205) (0.201) 
Greenfield dummy 0.547** 0.636*** 0.683*** 0.633*** 0.674*** 0.621*** 
 (0.175) (0.174) (0.177) (0.177) (0.175) (0.177) 
Miniature replica 0.247 0.253 0.299 0.254 0.221 0.270 
 (0.194) (0.187) (0.187) (0.188) (0.187) (0.188) 
Headquarters host country political embeddedness -0.108 -0.071 -0.114 -0.070 -0.086 -0.060 
 (0.091) (0.096) (0.095) (0.098) (0.095) (0.097) 
Governance quality  0.110 0.092 0.115 0.122 0.147 
  (0.122) (0.115) (0.124) (0.116) (0.121) 
Political stability  -0.034 -0.028 -0.033 -0.034 -0.096 
  (0.097) (0.099) (0.097) (0.095) (0.113) 
Geographic distance   (H1a: pos.)  0.243* 0.295** 0.243* 0.341** 0.259* 
  (0.101) (0.105) (0.101) (0.121) (0.100) 
Contextual distance   (H1b: pos.)  -0.009 -0.051 -0.027 -0.013 -0.077 
  (0.111) (0.107) (0.118) (0.106) (0.116) 
Geographic distance x Governance quality (H2a: neg.)   -0.192*    
   (0.088)    
Contextual distance x Governance quality (H2b: neg.)    -0.020   
    (0.073)   
Geographic distance x Political stability (H3a: neg.)     -0.182*  
     (0.091)  
Contextual distance x Political stability (H3b: neg.)      -0.137 
      (0.111) 
Constant -2.307** -2.329** -2.591*** -2.234** -2.537*** -2.350** 
 (0.835) (0.734) (0.648) (0.738) (0.643) (0.720) 
R² 0.191 0.250 0.279 0.250 0.284 0.258 
Adjusted R² 0.120 0.153 0.178 0.146 0.184 0.155 
F-statistic 2.66 3.35 3.65 3.22 3.47 3.22 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.  * p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001   
 
